I. INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-peer networks have been popularized by Napster, an online music file sharing application. P2P computing has since seen tremendous growth with the emergence of other popular file sharing applications like Gnutella, Chord, Freenet and KaZaA. P2P is fast becoming an important technology for use in distributive and collaborative work both in the Web and in other ad-hoc networks. In pure P2P networks, there is no centralized entity or server and computer resources and functions are shared by direct exchange between peer computer systems. Peers can join and leave the network dynamically. As peers are autonomous and depend on each other for computer resources and for getting information, there is a greater security risk as compared with other types of distributed systems.
The open, unrestricted environment of P2P architecture makes it an ideal environment for unauthorized access to resources and information and also for attackers to spread malicious content. P2P systems have to protect themselves from attacks by anonymous malicious peers. Peers must determine that other peers are indeed who they declare they are and should be able to determine whether other peers are authorized to access resources or functionalities. The peers involved must establish trust before their interactions. Trust in P2P systems is the degree of belief about another peer.
Trust Management (TM) is the process which collects the information about a peer which is necessary to establish a trust relationship [9] . Also it monitors and adjusts the existing trust relationship. Access control to the resources may be provided based on the trust relationship with the peer.
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) systems provide access control to resources based on the responsibility of the user within the organization. But this requires centralized administration of users and privileges, which is not supported by distributed systems. Role Based Trust (RT) for P2P systems combines the strengths of RBAC and TM to provide access control. RT systems can be categorized as Policy based systems where peers use credential verification to establish trust relationship.
The demand of Role based trust systems increases rapidly when the resources belong to different security domains and are controlled by different authorities. Also, in P2P systems, the resource owner and the requester are unknown to one another. This makes access control based on identity to be ineffective. Role based Trust Management gives rise to the systems in which the access control decisions are based on the properties about the requester that can be derived from his credentials.
The family of Role based trust (RT) languages among various Trust Management languages [12] is used to represent policies and credentials which help to create a Trust model. The chain of credentials [19] for making access control decisions are created from credentials obtained from the user. A Trust Management credential chain is often a graph, rather than a linear path. In RT language RT 0 , credential graphs are the searchable representation of credentials. However, the credential graphs may lead to the problem of cyclic dependency. This paper proposes a Role based Trust Model which uses Credential Tree to establish the trust relationship between peers in P2P networks. We first review the previous work related to our work in Section II. We discuss the technical overview of RT 0 in Section III. The credential chain construction is illustrated with an example using RT framework Section IV.
Credential Tree construction algorithm is discussed in Section V. The implementation details are given in Section VI. [15] , XRep [16] , NICE [13] in which the trust evaluation is based on measuring reputation. These systems are used to evaluate trust in the peer and trust in the reliability of the resource. Karl Aberer et. al. [20] proposed a Trust Management System which address the problem of reputation based trust management at both the data management and the semantic level. A Gossip based reputation system [2] collects the feedbacks from other peers and computes global reputation scores. PowerTrust [3] is also a reputation based system concentrates more on distributing the feedback about other peers. Instead of considering a peer to be trustworthy or not, various levels of trustworthiness are introduced based on fuzzy logic inferences. [6] .
In this paper we present an approach that addresses the problem of reputation-based trust management at both the data management and the semantic level.
Social Network based Trust systems are based on the social relationship between the peers and these systems evaluate trust based on the analysis of the social network. Marsh [25] , Regret [17] , NodeRanking [18] are some of the Social Network based Trust systems.
The Policy based Trust systems like SPKI/SDSI [14] , PolicyMaker [23] , KeyNote [24] , DelegationLogic [22] use credential verification to establish trust relationship for access control. These systems are based on the notion of delegation, whereby one entity gives some of its authority to other entities.
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) allows users access to resources based on their responsibilities within an organization. RBAC is more challenging in P2P systems, due to the lack of centralized administration. RBAC for P2P networks have been implemented using JXTA in [7] . RBAC deals only with authorization ensuring that a peer has access only to those resources that it should but not with authentication.
The credential is the statement signed by the issuer about a subject containing information about the subject. Policies govern the actions that principals are authorized to perform. Distributed authorization schemes allow enforcement of consistent security policies at end points, without assuming that the end points always have connectivity to a central server.
Role Based Trust (RT) languages are used for representing policies and credentials in distributed authorization [8] . The access control decisions are not necessarily based on the identity of the requester, but on the properties about him that can be derived from his credentials thus allowing anonymous interactions and role based trust models.
The introduction of RT framework [4] enables subject abstraction and supports distributed storage and discovery of credentials. Subject abstraction is the process of expressing the properties of the subject along with the attributes. The Role based Trust Management languages are a family of languages used for the construction of RT framework.
The design of Role Based Trust Framework and its languages are discussed in the work of Ningui Li, John C. Mitchell and William H. Winsborough [8] . RT 0 is the most basic language which introduces the semantics of credentials [10] . RT 1 adds the concept of attributes with fields or parameterized roles to RT 0. RT 2 introduces the concept of logical objects in which the roles have values that are set of things other than entities. RT 1 adds the concept of parameterized roles to RT 0 and RT 2 adds the logical object usage to RT 1. The language RT T introduces the concept of Separation of Duties (SoD) and two new operators for Multiple-role concurrence and for separation of duties. Selective use of role memberships has motivated the introduction of the language RT D which introduces dynamic delegation credentials.
The syntax and semantics of all these languages are based on that of RT 0. The credentials in all these languages are represented based on the semantics of RT 0. A credential chain is a chain of one or more credentials that delegates the authority from the source to the requestor. A central problem of Trust Management is to determine whether such a chain exists. This is "Credential Chain Discovery Problem".
A simple language RT 0 uses Credential graphs as the searchable representation of credentials. The storage of credentials can be centralized or distributed. Simple search algorithms were introduced for credential search if they are centrally stored. Goal directed algorithms and Heuristic search algorithms were introduced when the credential storage is distributed [1] .
The credential graphs are directed graphs, which may lead to the problem of cyclic dependency. The credential search process may terminate due to this problem and trust may not be established. In our approach we have constructed the credential tree using the RT 0 syntax. Credential search can be done using the constructed tree which avoids the cyclic dependency problem.
III. TECHNICAL OVERVIEW OF RT0
This section briefly introduces the terminologies used for the representation of Role Based trust management language RT 0 originally introduced by Li, et al [8] .
An entity, also known as principal is a uniquely identified individual or process. Entities are represented by capital letters or abbreviated words like A, B, University. A role defines a set of entities who are members of this role.
Roles are represented by an Entity followed by a role name as University.Student, A.r, B.r1. For example, University.student represents a role, where University is the owner and students denote the set of members of the role. Only University has the authority to determine who are the students or members of the role University.Student. Roles can also represent permissions as well as other properties (attributes) of the relation between members and role. Credentials are the statements that are signed by the Issuer about a subject containing the information about the subject. For example, a credential can be represented as:
PConf.Discount ← University.student
In
The role specifies a job function or a job title within an organization.
Some associated semantics specify the authority and responsibility conferred by a role.
The credentials used for representing various roles are of 4 types. This classification can be tabulated in Table I . A role identifier is denoted as an entity assigned with a local role. For example, University.student represents the student role assigned by the entity "University".
A principal may transfer limited authority over one or more resources to other principals using credentials. These credentials are passed from one principal to another and are used to establish the sending principal's access rights.
The credentials can be stored with the Issuer or the subject. If all the credentials are stored only with the subject, a subject must have all the credentials authorizing the subjects for any resource. This may create a bottleneck. Otherwise, all the credentials can be stored only with the Issuer as in the TM Systems like QCM (Query Certificate Manager), SD3. This was again proven to be impractical for practical applications [5] .
The credential chain, which is the chain of, credentials that delegates the authority from the source to the requestor.
Distributed Chain Discovery algorithm does not assume that the credentials are stored in one place. In Internet, the credentials are stored in a distributed manner, and the goal directed algorithm, issues a request for credentials, collects and then evaluates.
IV. CREDENTIAL CHAIN EXAMPLE
We use an example to illustrate policy, credentials and credential chains.
Let us consider a scenario where a student applies for admission to a Post Graduate programme in a University (Univ). The eligibility criteria for admission to the PG programme are:
• The student must have completed the Undergraduate progamme from a reputed University (RUniv) and obtained the degree • RUniv is a university that is accredited by the Accreditation Board (ABU) •
The student should submit a recommendation letter (RLet) from a faculty of Univ In the example, Alice is the student who has received the degree from the University which is accredited by ABU and Bob is the faculty who has given the recommendation to Alice.
The basic idea of role-based trust management systems is to establish a credential chain. Effective trust chaining will eliminate forged credentials and secure P2P operations. RT framework uses directed graphs as the searchable representation of credential chains. The graph construction is well explained in the work of Winsborough et al [5] and [8] .
A part of the credential graph which would be generated after reduction of credentials for the given example, is shown in Fig 1 [27] . In the graph, the nodes AdmC.Preferred and SelT.Preferred, refer to the peer node RUniv for two purposes. The node AdmC.Preferred requests the RUniv node, to verify the credentials of the Student and SelT.Preferred refers to the RUniv peer to verify the credentials of Faculty. This results in a cycle in the graph, which would lead to non-termination in the search process of credentials.
V. CREDENTIAL TREE CONSTRUCTION
In our approach, we have used Credential tree to construct the credential chain to avoid the cyclic dependency problem.
The algorithm used for credential tree construction is given below for the four types of Role Representations. Create a root node and add the first credential to the root. DFS is a uniformed search that starts from the first child node and progresses deeper and deeper till the goal node is found. If it hits a node that has no children, the search backtracks to the most recent node it has not finished exploring and proceeds with the search. The time taken by DFS to search [26] for an available node is expressed as :
where V is the number of vertices (nodes) and E is the number of edges.
For the example given in Section IV, the first credential PG.Admission is added to the root node. When the node for PG.Admission is created as a new node, the node Univ.PGAdm is added as a child node to it. With the next credential, the intersection role AdmC.Preferred ∩ SelT.Preferred is added to Univ.PGAdm. Since this node is an intersection node, by Step 4 of Credential Tree construction algorithm, it is branched into 2 nodes AdmC.Preferred and SelT.Preferred. The linked role AdmC.RUniv.Degree branches into 2 nodes say AdmC.RUniv and AdmC.Degree. In the case of Linked role, the entity remains the same. This procedure is followed for adding all other nodes to the tree. The constructed credential tree is shown in Fig 3 . 
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented the Role Based Trust model for peer-to-peer systems using Java.
The credentials were stored in a text file. Each peer maintains a set of credentials relating to peers within its domain. The validating peer collects the credentials for various involved peers and builds the credential tree. The requested peers supply the credentials available with it. The credential tree is used to verify the credentials and trustworthiness of the requester. The trustworthy peer thereby gains access to the requested resource.
To illustrate with the given example, the peer AdmC would build the credential tree for validating the trustworthiness of Alice. It would request peer RUniv for credentials and would be supplied with credentials relating to Alice. Likewise, peer SelT would request credentials relating to Alice from other related peers.
Once the credential tree is built, DFS algorithm is used for searching the credential tree for verification of the trustworthiness of the requester. The time taken for searching the credential tree can be expressed as
where MAX is the number of child nodes of the root node. A sample set of credentials for various example scenarios were considered and the experimental results are tabulated in Table II . As shown in Table II , the number of nodes generated increases proportionate to the number of linked and intersection roles. The varying number of linked and intersection roles in the input credentials are plotted against the number of nodes generated. This is illustrated in the graph shown in The credential tree construction time would be further reduced depending on the degree of duplication of the credentials available with the peers. For instance, the credential of Alice is available with the peers RUniv, Bob and Alice. The validating peer may first get the credentials from RUniv. The credentials of Alice and Bob would be included in the credentials supplied by RUniv; which are used by the validating peer to build the credential tree. When the validating peer requests the credentials from Alice from Bob, the credentials would already have been represented in the tree.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
P2P computing is emerging as a viable technology and computing model for business as well as for self-organized and self-managed online user communities. Secure exchanges of information and sharing of resources between peers become mandatory requirements for the successful deployment and use of P2P.
In this paper, we have proposed a Role Based Trust Model, a distributed trust architecture which uses credential trees for evaluating trust among peers in P2P networks. Peers can determine whom they can trust based on policies and credentials made by principals. Our work on credential tree construction is for RT 0 framework. This work can be extended for other RT languages.
As future work, we plan to apply Distributed Depth First Search (DDFS) algorithm for building and searching the credential tree. More detailed simulation and testing of the Trust Model network in live environments may also be undertaken for a more pragmatic evaluation of the proposed system. 
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